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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VERA L. JOHNSON, / 
Plaintiff/Appellant, / 
vs. / Case No. 860U37 
HAROLD L. JOHNSON, / 
Defendant/Respondent. / 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I 
Is the plaintiff entitled to a portion of the defendant's 
military retirement benefits pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §1408? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff has sought post-divorce relief for arrearages in 
alimony payments and for a portion of the defendant's military 
retirement benefits after previously appearing before the trial 
court after the decree had been entered for arrearages in child 
support. The lower court denied the plaintifffs request for a 
portion of the defendant's military retirement benefits on the 
grounds that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting the claim 
due to the fact that she had previously appeared before the court 
approximately one (1) year before raising post-divorce issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce 
that was signed and entered on February 3, 1982 by the Honorable 
J. Duffy Palmer, District Court Judge. (R 27-29) The parties had 
been married March 17, 1963 and the term of the marriage 
encompassed eighteen (18) years and ten (10) months of the 
thirty-one (31) total years that defendant spent in military 
service. The Decree of Divorce incorporated the terms of a 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement (R 21-22) that the 
parties entered into on December 28, 1981. The decree provided 
in relevant part as follows: 
That the defendant be and hereby is ordered to pay 
the plaintiff the sum of $400.00 per month as and for 
alimony, same to commence January 1, 198 2, with said 
sum to increase to $450.00 per month commencing October 
1, 1982, and on April 1, 1983, said sum shall increase 
to $500.00 per month. 
3. That the plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded 
all household furniture and furnishings she has in her 
possession; the 1978 Lincoln Continental Mark V and her 
personal belongings and effects. 
4. That the defendant be and hereby is awarded the 
Pontiac automobile; the furniture and furnishings in 
his possession, and his personal belongings and 
effects. 
5. That the defendant be and hereby is ordered to 
assume and discharge all marital debts and obligations 
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in the approximate amount of $12,000.00 and each party 
is ordered to assume and discharge any debts he may 
have incurred separately since August 13, 1981, the 
date of separation. (R 27-29) 
Neither the divorce decree nor the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R 24-26) made mention of the military retire-
ment that the defendant would obtain upon the termination of his 
military career; however, the Findings of Fact at paragraph 6 (R 
25) noted, "that the plaintiff is a well and able bodied person; 
that the defendant is also a well and able bodied person." In 
paragraph 4 of the Findings of Fact it noted "that during said 
marriage, the parties herein have accumulated various items of 
personal property." 
Subsequent to the divorce, the plaintiff filed a "Verified 
Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause" (R 30- 32) and 
obtained an Order to Show Cause in re Contempt (R 33) requiring 
the defendant to appear and show cause why he should not be found 
in contempt for failure to make certain alimony payments. The 
Order to Show Cause was originally heard before the Honorable 
Rodney S. Page, District Court Judge of the Second Judicial 
District, on June 21, 1984. The plaintiff was granted a judgment 
against the defendant, which was later reduced to an Order and 
Judgment (R 38-39) in the sum of $3,400.00 and defendant was 
further required to pay $200.00 in attorney's fees and costs of 
$19.00 and ordered to continue to pay alimony at the rate of 
$500.00. 
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The Congress of the United States enacted the Uniformed 
Services Former Spouses Protection Act with an effective date of 
February 1, 1983. The Act was undertaken in response to McCarty 
v. McCarty, 453 US 210 (1981) , which was decided prior to the 
instant parties1 original divorce. The plaintiff here made no 
claim for relief with regards to the defendant's military retire-
ment benefits in the 1984 Order to Show Cause hearing, despite 
the fact that the effective date of the legislation was after the 
entry of the decree of divorce. 
In September of 1985 the plaintiff once again tiled a 
Verified Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause (R 40-41) 
and obtained an Order to Show Cause in re Contempt (R 42) 
requiring the defendant to appear and answer why he should not be 
found in contempt for failure to make certain alimony payments. 
The affidavit contained no allegations of claim or grievance with 
regard to the military retirement benefits; however, the matter 
was heard by stipulation at the time of hearing on November 14, 
1985 (See transcript page 3 through 4) and was met with 
defendant's counter-evidence to the fact that he had suffered a 
change of circumstances mandating a reduction in the alimony 
award. 
The Court found that the defendant was in arrears in alimony 
in the sum of $1,119.00 and that plaintiff was entitled to a 
total delinquency judgment in the sum of $4,500.00 (R 46); 
further the Court found that the defendant's income had decreased 
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since his retirement from the military in June of 1985 from 
$2,300.00 per month to $1,700.00 per month (R 47). The Court 
concluded that the reduction in pay of 21 percent entitled the 
defendant to an equal reduction in the alimony payment from 
$500.00 to $391.00 per month. (R 46-48) The Court further 
determined that the plaintiff was entitled to a continuing 
alimony, despite defendant's allegations of cohabitation. 
Finally, the Court ruled that the plaintiff was estopped from 
bringing a claim against the defendant for a portion of his 
military retirement benefits which had been accumulated during 
his 31 years of military service. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The plaintiff assumes the position that the Uniformed 
Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. §1408, automat-
ically requires the court to allow a former spouse a proportion-
ate interest in retirement benefits. The Act does not 
specifically mandate that a former spouse be awarded a portion of 
the military retirement benefits. Legislative history behind the 
legislation indicates that the retroactive application of the 
same was designed to assist "aggrieved parties" who were divorced 
after McCarty v. McCarty, 452 US 210 (1981). Plaintiff herein is 
not a "wronged" party. She received the lion's share of the 
assets and was debt free pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation 
and Property Settlement Agreement as incorporated into the Decree 
of Divorce. The trial court in the November 1985 hearing noted, 
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in the reporters transcript (T 34) , that it appeared that 
consideration was taken as to the asset of the military 
retirement benefits during the time of the Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement. That being the case, the division 
of the assets conformed with Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P. 2d 431 
(Utah, 1982) in that the asset was considered in the total 
division of property rights and debt responsibilities of the 
parties. Thus, there was no harm inflicted upon the plaintiff 
that required implication of the congressional act to "undo" the 
divorce decree. 
Two years after the entry of the original Decree of Divorce, 
the plaintiff appeared before the court on a show cause hearing 
concerning the defendant's arrears in alimony payments. The show 
cause hearing was heard in May of 1984, two years after the 
effective date of the involved legislation. At that time, the 
plaintiff sought no relief to modify the Decree of Divorce in 
requesting a portion of the defendant's military retirement 
benefits, despite the fact that she was aided by counsel. The 
plaintiff's failure to bring any potential claim at that time 
estopped her from asserting it in 1985 at her second post-divorce 
proceeding regarding arrearages in alimony. The plaintiff is 
estopped not simply by the lapse of time, but by the implication 
of the principles of equitable estoppel, waiver and laches; 
further, the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement 
entered into between that parties included a recitation that "the 
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parties hereto agree that the foregoing is an equitable 
settlement of the property rights, alimony, and other demands 
that each of said parties have or has had, one against the other, 
and in the event the defendant is awarded a decree of divorce, 
each consents to the stipulation, in substance and effect be 
incorporated and become a part of said decree." (R 22) 
In the show cause hearing of November 1985, plaintiff failed 
to present to the court a material change in circumstances of a 
compelling nature that required a modification of the original 
Decree of Divorce. In fact, the only substantial change in 
circumstances presented at the November 1985 show cause hearing 
was with regards to the reduction in defendant's income of 
twenty-one percent (21%). The resultant reduction in income of 
defendant caused the court to reduce his alimony obligation to 
plaintiff by twenty-one percent (21%) . Without the presence of 
compelling facts indicating a change in the circumstances, the 
trial court found no basis for modifying the Decree of Divorce 
concerning the issue military retirement. 
The decision of the trial court was based upon facts and 
evidence presented therein and referenced to the earlier 
proceedings before that court; specifically, the 1984 show cause 
hearing concerning the arrearage of support and the original 
Decree of Divorce, which was based upon a Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement of the parties. Consequently, the 
lower court's determination denying plaintiff a portion of 
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defendant's military retirement benefits was proper and should be 
upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT AN "AGRIEVED" PARTY AND NECESSARILY 
ENTITLED TO ANY PORTION OF DEFENDANT'S RETIREMENT PURSUANT 
TO THE UNIFORM SERVICES FORMER SPOUSE PROTECTION ACT, 10 
U.S.C. §1408 
In response to McCarty v. McCarty 453 US 210 (1981), the 
Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection 
Law, Public Law 97-252. The essence of the Act is to give the 
state courts the ability to include in a property distribution of 
divorce proceedings military retirement benefits. The Act 
specifically provides in Sec. (c)(1): 
"...a Court may treat disposable retired or retainer 
pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning after 
June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member 
or as property of the member and his spouse in 
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such 
court," 
It should be noted at the outset that the language of the 
statute is not compulsive and states "may" be free to choose the 
particular application of the benefits as marital property or 
nonmarital property. In Smith v. Smith, 458 A.2d 711 (Del. Fam. 
Ct. , 1983), the court was confronted with a similar situation to 
the one at hand and the committee report which accompanied the 
bill, page one, as follows: 
The primary purpose of the bill is to remove the effect 
of the United States Supreme Court decision in McCarty 
v. McCarty, 458 (453) US 210 101 S. CT. 2728 69 L.Ed. 
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2d 589 (1981). The bill would accomplish their objec-
tive by permitting federal, state and certain other 
courts, consistent with the appropriate laws, to once 
again consider military retire pay when fixing the 
property rights between the parties to a divorce, 
dissolution, annulment or legal separation. 
Further, the report provided that, Page 5: 
Former spouses divorced in the interim period between 
the McCarty decision and the effective date of this law 
will have the opportunity to return to court to have 
their decrees modified in light of this legislation. 
The Smith court noted, with regards to this language, 
"Congress clearly felt that spouses agrieved as a result of 
McCarty should have a chance to rectity this situation" through 
the retroactive application of the law. The key element therein 
is that of "spouses agrieved". The Smith court permitted the 
spouse to modify the decree of divorce and obtain a portion of 
the military retirement benefits. The situation at bar finds a 
plaintiff who is not "agrieved"; rather, the decision of the 
district court in adopting the Stipulation and Property Settle-
ment of the parties at the time of the decree should conport with 
with then operative law with regards thereto. See Englert v. 
Englert, 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah, 1978) and Bennett v. Bennett, 607 
P.2d 839 (Utah, 1980). The Bennett pronouncement of not 
considering nonvested pension rights was overturned by Woodward 
v. Woodward, op. cit. Even in light of the Woodward decision, 
the property distribution of the parties herein appeared to 
contemplate the defendant's military retirement, as noted by the 
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District Court Judge at page 34 of the reporter's transcript 
wherein he indicated as follows: 
As to the question of retirement, the Court finds that 
the parties were divorced in 1983; that they entered 
into a stipulation for the divorce at that time and the 
Court assumes that they considered all the parties' 
property in their 18 years of marriage together, I 
think that is reflective of the fact that there was an 
alimony awarded of a substantial amount which was of an 
unlimited duration. 
Accompanying the significant alimony award is the fact that the 
defendant undertook all of the marital debts, which were of a sum 
of approximately $12,000.00. 
In Wallace v. Wallace, 671 P.2d 711 (Or. App. 1983) the 
Oregon court was confronted with an appeal by the spouse of a 
retired Navy officer. The property settlement denied the spouse 
a forty-five percent (45%) interest in the husband's retirement 
pension. The court indicated at page 714 that: 
After McCarty, but before the Act became effective, 
this court stated that a spouse's military retirement 
pension, while not divisible, can be considered in 
awarding support or making property divisions...The act 
permits, but does not require, state courts to consider 
military retirement payments as marital property. 
The court concluded that evidence of the husband's military 
retirement pension was considered in establishing the amount of 
alimony payable to the wife and thus an allocation of a portion 
of the benefits was not required. The circumstances at hand are 
identical to that of the Wallace matter and mandate support of 
the district court ruling. 
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Plaintiff, in her brief, cites cases wherein the parties 
were permitted to modify the decree of divorce and receive a 
portion of the spouse's military retirement benefits. It appears 
that the large body of those cases involved community property 
states wherein it is well established that property which is not 
mentioned in the decree of divorce results in a tenancy in common 
between the parties in that asset. Henn v. Henn, 605 P. 2d 10 
(Cal., 1980), Walentowski v. Walentowski, 672 P.2d 657 (N.M., 
1983), Gordon v. Gordon, 659 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. App. 13
 # Dist. , 
1983), de Carteret v. de Carteret, 615 P.2d 513 (Wash. App., 
1980) . The courts in each of those circumstances dealt with an 
asset that required specific resolution after the decree of 
divorce. Further, in each of the above cases, as cited by 
plaintiff, there was no indication that the court had considered 
the military retirement in awarding alimony or other division of 
properties, as was specifically noted in the Wallace, op. cit. 
As previously indicated in the instant case, it appears from the 
stipulation, pleadings, orders and comments of the court (see 
reporter's transcript page 34) that the military retirement 
benefits were considered by the parties and the court at the 
original Decree of Divorce. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE ISSUE OF 
MILITARY RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
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The court found that the plaintiff was estopped from 
asserting a claim for the military retirement benefits. (R 47) 
Estoppel can undertake several forms; it is basically an 
equitable principle that is called into effect in several 
different respects in this particular matter. 
A. RES JUDICATA 
The plaintiff was before the court on two separate occasions 
before making a request for an allocations of the military 
retirement benefits. The original divorce proceeding permitted 
the plaintiff an opportunity to have the matter heard; further, 
the plaintiff appeared before the court in May of 1984 with the 
opportunity to litigate the question of modification with regards 
to military retirement benefits. The May 1984 appearance was 
after the effective date of the involved legislation and was 
brought with the assistance of counsel. In neither of the 
above-mentioned occasions did the plaintiff assert a claim for a 
portion of the defendant's military retirement benefits. In 
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303 (Utah, 1985), the Utah Supreme 
Court determined that an action by a former husband against a 
former spouse to reconvey a partial interest in real property was 
prohibited by res judicata. The parties were divorced in 1977, 
after Mr. Jacobson had conveyed an interest in property to 
Mrs. Jacobson and alleged that she had promised to reconvey half 
of the interest of that property back to Mr. Jacobson after 
conclusion of litigation between Mr. Jacobson and his first wife. 
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The parties had been named as defendants in an action over the 
title of the property several years prior to the divorce 
proceeding and Mr. Jacobson was dismissed from that case upon his 
representation that he had no interest in the land. Mrs. 
Jacobson was subsequently awarded the entire interest in the 
property two (2) years prior to the divorce. The divorce was 
resolved upon stipulation, wherein Mrs. Jacobson received the 
entire interest in the land. Mr. Jacobson subsequently com-
plained that he had been induced to sign the property settlement 
agreement upon the condition that the former spouse would promise 
to reconvey the interest in the property. The trial court 
determined that his action was barred by res judicata. The court 
repeated the language of Mendenhall v. Kingston, 610 P. 2d 1287, 
1289, wherein it said: 
Where there has been an adjudication, it becomes res 
judicata as to those issues which were either tried and 
determined, or upon all issues which the party had a 
fair opportunity to present and had determined in the 
other proceeding. 703 P.2d at 305. 
The court further noted that the principle had application in 
and stated: 
This court is clearly committed to the proposition that 
in order to modify a prior decree, the moving party 
must show a substantial change in circumstances. In 
the absence of such a showing, the decree shall not be 
modified in a matter previously litigated and incor-
porated therein cannot be collaterally attacked in the 
face of the doctrine of res judicata. 703 P.2d at 305 
from Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 1091 
(Utah, 1978) . 
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In the instant case, the Decree of Divorce should not be 
modified because the plaintiff had a "fair opportunity to present 
and have determined" the issue of any claims in the military 
retirement of defendant, 
B. WAIVER 
The doctrine of waiver is a further application of the 
principle of estoppel. In American Savings and Loan Association 
v, Blomquist, 445 P.2d 1 (Utah, 1968), the Utah Supreme Court was 
confronted with a mortgage foreclosure action and was required to 
determine whether the plaintiffs had waived the contents of a 
default notice through a subsequent letter. In determining that 
there had been no waiver in that circumstance, the court defined 
waiver at page 3 as follows: 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right. To constitute a waiver, there must be an 
existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of 
its existence and an intention to relinquish it. It 
must be distinctly made although it may be express or 
implied. 
In the instant case, the case of the plaintiff and failing to 
proceed on a claim for military retirement benefits amounted to 
implied waiver. The plaintiff was possessed of the knowledge 
that the defendant would receive retirement pay after his com-
pletion of his military service. The fact that the military 
service was not completed until June of 1985 was of no 
significance and the plaintiff not was required to wait until the 
expiration of the military service. 
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In the Court of Appeals of Washington, Myser v. Myser, 589 
P.2d 277 (Wash, App. , 1979), an ex-wife of a retired Air Force 
officer sought to be declared a co-tenant of the husband's 
military pension payments which he had been receiving since the 
time of the divorce. The parties had been divorce pursuant to a 
property settlement agreement which provided for child support 
and support for Mrs. Myser. The stipulation and property 
settlement agreement provided that there was a "full and complete 
settlement of all their property rights..." The trial court 
dismissed Mrs. Myserfs second action on the following grounds: 
1. The court lacked jurisdiction to declare the parties 
tenants in common with respect to the retirement 
pension fund? 
2. Mrs. Myser waived any claim in regard to that fund by 
virtue of the property settlement agreement; 
3. Mrs. Myser was estopped to assert any claim against the 
pension payment because of the property settlement 
agreement; and 
4. The terms of the agreement made pension funds the 
separate property of Mr. Myser. 589 P.2d at 2 78. 
The Washington Court went on to discuss the applicability of 
military retirement benefits which at that time was basically in 
line with the Utah Supreme Court holding in Bennett v. Bennett, 
op. cit. Further, in the Myser case, in tracing the history of 
Washington decisions, the court noted that in In Re Marriage of 
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Hagy, 581 P.2d b98 (Wash. App. , 1978) the court had found that 
where it was the intention of the parties at the time of the 
property settlement agreement in the divorce decree to provide a 
full and complete settlement of their property rights, there 
would be no reopening of the proceeding. In the case at hand, 
the stipulation and property settlement agreement, paragraph 10 
(R 22) provides as follows: 
That the parties hereto agree that the foregoing is an 
equitable settlement of the property rights, alimony, 
and other demands that each of said parties may have or 
have had, one against the other, and in the event the 
defendant is awarded.a decree of divorce, each consents 
that the stipulation, in substance and effect, may be 
incorporated and made a part of said decree. 
Thus, the plaintiff effectively, and with knowledge of the 
existence of military retirement benefits, waived her rights to 
any other property claims against the defendant. 
C. ESTOPPEL. 
Justice Maughn in Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah, 1979) determined that the 
Liquor Control Commissions denial of a license to a private club 
where it had previously represented that the club was in 
compliance with statutes concerning location within 600 feet of 
any public or private school specifically set forth the elements 
of equitable estoppel as: 
1. An admission, statement or act inconsistent with the 
claim afterwards asserted; 
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2. Action by the other party on the faith ot such 
admission, statement, or act; and 
3. Injury to such other party resulting from allowing the 
first party to contradict or repudiate such admission, 
statement or act, 602 P.2d at 694 
In this case, the defendant consented to a Stipulation and 
Property Settlement Agreement wherein he and plaintiff mutually 
agreed to release all claims; further, the plaintiff brought no 
action against the defendant post-divorce to seek a portion of 
military retirement benefits by bringing to the court's attention 
an arrearage in alimony. Defendant acted on the acts and 
omissions of the plaintiff by agreeing to satisfy certain sums of 
alimony, pay debts and ultimately terminate his military service. 
The injuries received by defendant were through the assumption of 
an increased portion of the debt and payment of a substantial sum 
of alimony per month which may not otherwise have been assessed, 
together with the latter reduction in available monthly income 
from termination of service in the military. The elements of 
equitable estoppel as applied in the State of Utah are present to 
prohibit the plaintiff from bringing an action to collect a 
portion of the defendant's military retirement benefits. 
D. LACHES. 
The final derivative of the estoppel concept that is 
available to the defendant in this circumstance is the notion of 
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laches. The Utah Supreme Court in Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 
(Utah, 1980) set forth the two elements of laches to be: 
1. A lack of diligence of on the part of the plaintiff; 
and 
2. An injury to the defendant owing to such lack of 
diligence. 
In Leaver, the Court found that laches was not applicable to the 
real estate claims regarding restrictive covenants, but noted at 
page 1264 that: 
The doctrine of estoppel has application when one, by 
his acts, representations or conduct or by his silence 
when he ought to speak induces another to believe that 
certain facts exist and such other relies thereon to 
his detriment. 
The analysis herein is similar and the acts and resultant 
injury are identical to that indicated in the section above with 
regards to equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT SHOW A COMPELLING REASON THROUGH ANY 
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY 
MODIFICATION OF THE DIVORCE DECREE 
30-3-5 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides in part that: 
The Court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make 
such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to 
the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody 
of the children and their support, maintenance, and 
health and dental care, or the distribution of the 
property as shall be reasonable and necessary. 
With the ability to modify a decree of divorce, the trial 
courts in any given circumstance must determine in which 
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situations a decree may be modified. In order to modify the 
decree of divorce, the moving party must "show the trial court a 
substantial change in the circumstances since the decree of 
divorce." Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360 (Utah, 1985). In 
the cases involving property, the Utah Supreme Court has 
frequently been asked to determine if the same can be modified. 
In Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412 (Utah, 1980), the wife sought 
modification of the award to her former husband of a fifty 
percent (50%) lien interest in the marital home. The trial court 
permitted modification due to certain financial hardship 
circumstances but was reversed by the Supreme Court on appeal. 
The Court stated at page 414 that: 
...where the property disposition is the product of an 
agreement and stipulation between the parties, and 
sanctioned by the trial court. Such a provision is the 
product of an agreement bargained for by the parties. 
As such, a trial court should subsequently modify such 
a provision only with great reluctance, and based upon 
compelling reasons. 
The Court failed to find any compelling reason for the 
modification in Foulger where the decree of divorce was based 
upon a stipulation and property settlement agreement entered into 
between the parties. 
In Despain v, Despain, 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah, 1980), the Court 
again determined that there was no compelling change in the 
circumstances such to modify a decree of divorce in regards to a 
trust; more specifically where the moving party had entered into 
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a release with regards to the property. In so holding the Court 
stated at pages 1305-1306: 
This issue was most recently before the Court in Land 
v. Land (605 P.2d 1248, (Utah, 1986)) wherein we 
observed that the outright abrogation of the provisions 
of a property settlement agreement is to be resorted to 
with great reluctance and only for compelling reasons. 
In this case, there is no substantial change in the 
circumstances of a compellingly sufficient nature to modify the 
decree as sought by the plaintiff. The trial court determined 
that the only compelling change in circumstances was the fact 
that the defendant's income had decreased by 21 percent (R 4 7). 
As a direct result of the defendant's loss of income from 
$2,300.00 to $1,700.00 per month, his obligations for alimony was 
reduced by an equal percentage, from $500.00 to $391.00 per 
month. (R 48-57) There was no evidence brought to the court that 
there had been any other change in circumstances of the parties 
specifically sufficient enough to award the plaintiff an interest 
in the defendant's military pay. The fact that 10 U.S.C. 1408 
(c) (1) provides that "a spouse may be entitled'1 to a portion of 
the military retirement benefits does not create the facts in 
this particular circumstance to justify a modification of the 
original Decree of Divorce. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETIONARY 
FUNCTION AND SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED ' 
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In order for the plaintiff to be successful on her appeal, 
she must "show the evidence clearly preponderates against the 
findings or that the trial court has abused its discretion." 
Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah, 1985), citing 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 610 P.2d 1218 (Utah, 1980) and Turner v. 
Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah, 1982). 
In Despain v. Despain, op. cit. the Court at page 1305-6, in 
confirming a position previously stated in Jorgensen v. 
Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah, 1979), Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 
580 P.2d 1090, (Utah, 1978), Johnson v. Johnson, 560 P.2d 1132 
(Utah, 1977) , that: 
in the formulation of the original decree and any 
modifications thereof; the trial court is vested broad 
discretionary powers, which may be disturbed by an 
appellant court only in the presence of clear abuse 
thereof. 
Herein the trial court noted that prior consideration in the 
original decree with regards to the substantial alimony award 
payable on a continuing basis from the defendant to the plaintiff 
(see reporter's transcript page 34) together with the contents of 
the stipulation and finally the failure of the plaintiff to bring 
her claim when she had previously been before the court on other 
occasions estopped the plaintiff from asserting a claim for a 
portion of the defendant's military retirement benefits. This 
determination by the trial court was based upon a reasonable 
interpretation of the evidence as presented to the court and 
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supported by the contents of the record and therefore should not 
be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
It is evident from the foregoing discussion and the 
undisputed facts which were before the trial court that the 
plaintifffs claim for a portion of the defendant's military 
retirement benefits were properly denied and that the lower 
court's ruling should be atfirmed. 
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